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Working Group Summaries 2007

February 13, 2007 - Eren Tasar, "Muslim Life in Central Asia, 1943-1985"

The period from World War II to the rise of Gorbachev witnessed a unique historical interaction between Islam and Soviet Communism in Central Asia. While the nature of state control over religion changed and gradually become more relaxed, political and economic stability improved the quality of life across the region. Many Central Asian Muslims developed bonds of identify and loyalty to the Soviet state and some aspects of Communism. The conditions engendered by Soviet social and political policies created new possibilities for the emergence of a Soviet Central Asian Islamic culture. For this reason, it is necessary to examine the relations between the state on the one hand, and legally registered and illegal networks of Islamic education on the other, within the broader context of the complex interaction of Muslim communities with Soviet Communism. This dissertation will question how the Soviet party-state and Muslim communities interacted with one another, and thereby challenge the consensus of much past scholarship that the relationship of Central Asian Muslims to the Soviet state was marked exclusively by resistance. [Back to top.]

March 6, 2007 - Emil Souleimanov, "Political Implications of the (Non)recognition of Armenian Genocide

Emil Souleimanov (Sulejmanov) argued that the issue of the recognition of Armenian Genocide has long ago become a political one.
 
First, Armenian president Robert Kocharyan, a native of Mountainous Karabakh with strong ties to the Russian military, saw as his main task to improve national unity, which was gradually reduced in domestic squabbles in the wake of Armenian's victory over Azerbaijan in the 1988-1994 war. Supported by nationalists and the Kremlin, Kocharyan replaced former president Levon Ter-Petrosyan, who was forced to resign (1998) due to his apparent willingness to make serious concessions to Baku on the Karabakh issue. Kocharyan's policies worsened chances of a resolution to the conflict, further contributing to frustration in Azerbaijan and increasing calls there for a military solution. Importantly, the images of the Turks and Azerbaijanis have been made to increasingly coincide in Armenian society, both being regarded as 'Turks'. The systematic exploitation of the genocide issue is linked with this, as it has a strong mobilization potential and is key to nail the link between Armenians in the Republic and those in the diaspora. Being central to Armenian nationalism, it is also believed to slow the assimilation of the young generations of diaspora Armenians and improve their attachment to the Armenian homeland.

Partly as a consequence of the aim of cultivating the image of an external enemy, substantial financial aid from diaspora Armenians to Armenia and Karabakh intensified in recent years. Armenian diasporas in Russia, America, France and elsewhere have worked ever more closely with the Armenian state, especially as regards genocide recognition issues. Starting from 1998, a new wave of countries in Europe and America have seen various authorities recognize the massacres of 1915 as genocide. In brief, this policy is expected to strengthen Kocharyan's position in the country where strong objections prevail to his regime's legitimacy.

Second, Yerevan's objective to achieve genocide recognition by the international community have had a momentous international dimension. Importantly, the series of states recognizing the massacres as Genocide creates a group of states to which Ankara is anxious to use reciprocal means. This in turn contributes to the worsening of Turkish relations with those states and isolating itself on the international scene. Naturally, the more states recognize the massacres as genocide, the stronger the international pressure on Ankara to follow suit. With the crucial assistance of its diasporas in the EU states, Armenia seeks to tie Turkish genocide recognition directly with the prospects of Turkey's entrance into the EU.

In backroom talks, Armenian strategists admit that under certain historical circumstances, Yerevan might invoke the issue of "regaining the territories of Western Armenia", as Armenians refer to several provinces in Eastern Turkey. This very ambitious project could become realistic only in the event of Turkey's disintegration. Some circles in Armenia and elsewhere speculate this could happen in the next 40 to 50 years if the long-standing demographical boom in Kurdish-populated areas continues, which could lead the numbers of Turks and Kurds in Turkey to even out, while the growth of Kurdish nationalism and separatism alongside the ongoing establishment of a de facto Kurdish political entity in Northern Iraq complicates matters. Of course, Armenian analysts of this persuasion neglect the key fact that the areas they consider to be Western Armenia are now inhabited by millions of primarily Kurdish people who consider these territories their own. Hence there is little hope that even in the remote – not to say delirious – proposition of Turkey falling apart, these inhabitants would show much understanding for Armenia's age-long aspirations. A more modest expectation, shared by many more Armenians, is seeking compensation from the Turkish state for the lives and properties of the murdered Armenians by their descendants.

Third, whether Ankara proceeds to genocide recognition or not, this will have serious implications for the nature of the Turkish state. In fact, the modern Republic was built by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk and his fellowmen in clear opposition to the Ottoman Empire, and does not consider itself the latters successor per se. Furthermore, the massacres of Armenians were carried out while a narrow group of high-ranked Young Turks (Enver, Talaat, Cemal) de facto ruled the country during the World War I. To recognize a purported genocide carried out by a non-existent state and a despised former leadership, and to bring formal condolences about it may seem to be the easiest way out the situation.

Yet this prospect, seemingly logical to outsiders, neglects both growing nationalism in Turkey and the role of the Turkish military. Indeed, the Army is considered the guarantor of the Republic's secular character, its independence and unity, and hence has a nimbus of holiness. A "defilement" of the Turkish Army by admitting the to a genocide is thus completely unacceptable for the influential Turkish military brass and large numbers of Turks. The top brass, moreover, consider genocide recognition would not only disgrace the army but also bring about far-reaching effects for the countrys sacred unity.

A number of EU member states, opposing Turkish EU membership for various reasons, seem to have incorporated genocide recognition along with other issues such as Kurdish rights and Turkey's Muslim identity to their agenda. These countries, including France and Austria, appear to view the Armenian question more as a way to stop Turkey than an issue in its own right. As accession talks intensify in the years to come, this trend could easily gain salience.

This has already led to a certain modification of Ankara's view on what happened to the Armenians in the final years of the Ottoman Empire. The Turkish position now acknowledges that up to 300,000 Armenians, just like hundreds of thousands of Ottoman citizens regardless of their ethnic origins, lost their lives in Eastern Anatolia as a result of civil warfare, diseases and famine that afflicted the countryside during the first world war. Recent commentaries even admit that many Armenians died as a consequence of their forced displacement from war zones into the Syrian Desert. Yet though some Turkish voices do use the term "massacres", officials outlets stress the point that no state-sanctioned policy of genocide existed. In recent years, some Turkish historians and part of the country's intellectual elite, based mainly outside Turkey, have called on Ankara for recognize the genocide. Yet resistance against such claims is compact.

Fourth, similarly, in Armenia the reverse picture is true: even references to the killings of thousands of Turks and Azerbaijanis by Armenian nationalists in Eastern Anatolia and Armenia proper during the first world war and its aftermath are a strict taboo. Turkish society remains heavily uninformed about the topic; its rather neutral attitude towards Armenians turns negative only in the reaction to what is considered "Armenian lies", as well as in relation to the Karabakh issue, in which the Turks side with their Azerbaijani Turkic brethren.

Fifth, with its long-term goals remaining vague and hardly predictable, Yerevans stance to have the international community recognize the massacres of 1915 as genocide have contributed to a visible deterioration of Armenian-Turkish relations, and hence increased Armenia's one-sided dependence on Russia, which is seen as the country's only security guarantor vis-a-vis hostile Turkey. Accordingly, in an effort to ensure a devoted ally in the strategic South Caucasus region, Moscow is thoroughly opposing a rapprochement between Armenia and Turkey, just as it opposes a resolution to the Armenia-Azerbaijan dispute. Whereas the Karabakh conflict has considerably limited Yerevans space of maneuver in the Caucasus, the genocide recognition issue has done very much the same in Armenia's relationship with its Western neighbor, pushing Ankara into Baku's firm embrace. [Back to top.]

March 13, 2007 - Noah Tucker, "Into Russian Turkistan 1872-1917: English Travel Literature and the Creation of the Russian Orient"

This paper is designed as a survey and criticism of English-language travel literature published by British and American visitors to Turkistan under Russian rule, from the first account in 1873 until the fall of the Russian Empire in 1917. It draws on a broad base of diverse accounts from men and women who traveled as journalists, a diplomat, a missionary, adventurers, scholars, and even the only man ever to ride a bicycle from London to Khiva. While subsequent travel literature has sometimes referenced these accounts, there does not appear to be published work that analyzes this small genre and provides a window into late 19th and early 20th century public conceptions of this little-known region in the US and Britain.

An in depth study shows us that these visitors’ experiences were shaped by pre-existing conceptions of the region from earlier visitors, and that these conceptions were largely in line with what would be expected by Orientalist criticism. Visitors expected to find a region characterized by abstract violence, religious fanaticism, slavery, and sub-human treatment of women confined as sexual objects in harems; however, the real situation in Turkistan was much more complex, and the authors found themselves encountering and reacting to Russian colonialism and Russian discursive interpretation of local culture, which they generally saw for what it was often without being able to identify their own biases. In a maddening series of contradictions, most authors alternatively damn and praise the Russian colonial project. The Russians are portrayed as inauthentic representatives of European civilization and maliciously criticized, and only pages later lavishly praised as bearers of European progress to the dark and stagnant Orient. In light of these works, my analysis considers whether or not Orientalism can or should be extended to the Russian colonial project.[Back to top.]

March 20, 2007 - Catherine Drew, "The Foreign Policy of Small States: Kyrgyzstan's Foreign Policy under President Bakiyev"

On April 19, 2005, President Kurmanbek Bakiyev of Kyrgyzstan demanded a 100-fold increase in the rent that the United States pays for access to the airbase at the Manas airport in Bishkek. This unexpected foreign policy move raised questions about how small, weak countries such as Kyrgyzstan can make stiff demands on powerful countries like the US. This analysis attempts to explain the leverage small countries have on the international arena, and why they choose to formulate bold policies when negotiating from a position of seeming weakness. Kyrgyzstan has been able to successfully use its geostrategic location next to Afghanistan as a means to gain economic concessions from the US. President Bakiyev has used the country's foreign relations in an attempt to stay in power and increase the state budget. The domestic political situation in Kyrgyzstan helps explain why President Bakiyev chose to take a hard stance vis-a-vis the United States while attempting to maintain closer ties with Russia. President Bakiyev's close links with Russia help ensure Russian political support for the Bakiyev administration's policies. In addition, President's Bakiyev's demands on the US have garned additional funds for Kyrgyzstan's small state budget and its economic and social programs.[Back to top.]

April 3, 2007 - John Schoeberlein, "Interpreting Islam and Politics in Post-Soviet Central Asia"

Dr. John Schoeberlein summarized how scholars interpret Islam and politics in post-Soviet Central before relaying his own argument during the working group meeting. He first noted two positions that scholars of Islam in Central Asia currently adhere to. The first is represented in the work of Vitaly Naumkin. Naumkin argues that "Islamic resurgence" in Central Asia is a serious concern for the following reasons: Organizations such as the IMU reflect the existence of violent radicalism in the region; there seems to be an intrinsic tendency in Muslim society to oppose secular and Western values; and the violence represents something on the verge of becoming an epidemic – it is not a marginal phenomenon. Dr. Schoeberlein juxtaposed this position with that of Adeeb Khalid, who argues that Islam is not politically important for the region. Khalid argues that the past violence in Central Asia is not as important as it is claimed to be, and that radicalism, in general, is foreign to Central Asia, with its tradition of moderate Islam and Soviet secularization. Moreover, any claims of the danger of Islamic radicalism represent Orientalist biases. In addition to describing these two main positions in the literature, Dr. Schoeberlein also talked about variations, nuances, and additional propositions scholars have introduced. Dr. Schoeberlein noted that there is much confusion and imprecision in how terms such as "fundamentalist" and "Wahhabi" are used, and he also pointed out several assumptions which are present in scholars' arguments.

Dr. Schoeberlein then presented his own thoughts on interpreting Islam and politics in the region. First, he argued that the role of Islam in Central Asia is undergoing great change. Although this change is an inevitable consequence of the collapse of the Soviet Union and the opening up of the region, it is leading to stresses in Central Asian society. On the one hand, the Central Asian governments want to control what is happening with Islam in their countries, while their constituencies have diverse aspirations regarding the role of Islam in politics. Among the population, there are widely divergent views of the appropriate role for Islam and contradictory visions of the direction that they would like to see their societies develop in. As these processes unfold, the gaps between the divergent positions are becoming larger. The only way that these stresses can be overcome is through public dialogue which prompts people to examine and reconcile the different positions. Unfortunately, there is little discourse on the role of Islam in Central Asia which acknowledges the different positions, even in countries such as Kyrgyzstan, where the media and political atmosphere are relatively open, and this is all the more problematic in other, more authoritarian countries, where the government attempts to dictate the views that people hold rather than allowing consensus through dialogue. [Back to top.]

April 24, 2007 - Nozima Kamalova, "War against Terrorism versus Human Rights: A Case Study of Uzbekistan"

This paper presents an analysis of a political paradigm shaped by the Global War on Terror.  The War on Terror has been used by authoritarian governments like Uzbekistan to advance their own political agendas, ultimately undermining the basis of democracy.

The author presents the cases of individuals who were detained for what the government called “terrorist activities” and subsequently tortured in order to produce confessions. Many such events have been documented. However, the author focuses on the Andijan massacre, where in the name of security and the war on terror the government used excessive force against protesters. Government-led repression, widespread injustice and social-economic problems caused the protests in Andijan in May 2005, which resulted in massive massacres. The paper analyses different versions of the Andijan massacre, including the government's version, independent reports and different scholars’ opinions.  “It is likely that the Uzbek government, instead of conducting a police action, took military action against the crowd. Furthermore, no clear evidence that the military issued any advance warning or that they tried non-lethal means, such as tear gas, to clear the crowd before opening fire exists,” the author states.

The author concludes that Uzbekistan’s war against terrorism has no other outcome but a vicious cycle of repression. Uzbekistan’s experience leads to the conclusion that a broad definition of terrorism gives too much latitude to different countries to violate human rights and repress in the name of fighting terrorism. The West should avoid engaging in military cooperation and training with authoritarian countries. Respect for democracy and human rights, as well as the continuation of support of civil society organizations, should be included as key benchmarks for democratic reforms. [Back to top].

May 1, 2007 - Darya Lobina, "Correlation of cognitive and emotional components in ethnic identity"

The problems of ethnic identity are the key element in the system of ethno psychological phenomena, and they are the object of study in Ethnic Psychology, Psychology of Personality, Social Psychology, Ethnology, Sociology, and History. Given the increase in the role of ethnic factors in human relations, both interpersonal and interstate, it is urgent to consider ethnic identity. In spite of the fact that problems of ethnic identity, both theoretical and empirical, receive close attention, the terminological vagueness of the concept and divergence in views in phenomenology, as well as the mechanisms of its construction and transformation should be noted. Another point is that existing theoretical conceptions have only been tested in a limited number of social situations.

Opinions diverge regarding the components of ethnic identity diverge. There are two basic components: cognitive and emotional, but some authors add a behavioral component to ethnic identity. Most authors, however, point to two main components within the structure of ethnic identity.  They stress that stable ethnic identity and its positive character are the necessary conditions for a person to feel psychologically safe in a social group. That is why it is necessary to study how such an emotionally-appraising system is formed and manifested. [Back to top].

May 8, 2007 - Venerahan Torobekova, "Tribalism in Kyrgyzstan: A Case Study"

In the research paper, I focus on the assumption of Kyrgyz society that “tribalism” is one of the major internal problems in the process of transition to democracy. “Tribalism” in Kyrgyzstan has a variable meaning. In this study I concentrate on Sarybagysh tribe that is ex-president, Askar Akaev’s tribe and consider the level of influence of Sarybagysh ties in politics. In other words, this work attempts to respond questions as: Does tribal ties rule the country? What tribal groups are related to power? How politics in Kyrgyzstan works? [Back to top].

May 16, 2007 - Laura Adams, "The Politics of History and Collective Memory in Tashkent"

Laura presented material based on a chapter from her forthcoming book, The Spectacular State: Culture and National Identity in Uzbekistan. In this presentation, the politics of history in contemporary Tashkent are explored through the lens of social memory, specifically the way that memory is embedded in and erased from the landscape of Uzbekistan's capital city. Changes in public space, such as street name changes, the construction and dismantling of public memorials and museums, and the changing nature of public architecture, shed light on what parts of history serve as a "useable past" for the Karimov regime, and what the public use of these spaces says about complicity and resistance to the regime. [Back to top].

Program on Central Asia and the Caucasus
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