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Working Group Summaries 2006

Sept. 26, 2006 - Noor O'Neill, "NGOs in Kyrgyzstan: Civics Education and Change"

I presented a chapter from my dissertation, "Encounters: Ideology, Inequality, and Change in the Kyrgyz Republic." The chapter, titled "NGOs in Kyrgyzstan: Civics Education and Change," drew on my fieldwork (2003-2005) with several NGOs in Kyrgyzstan, especially NGOs that promote democratization. The chapter was not a critique of the NGO sector, but an investigation of how people in the sector theorize change—namely, democratization—and how they translate these theories into projects on the ground. I examined the ideologies of change that are popular, how they get articulated, how NGO leaders and donors position themselves vis-à-vis these theories of change, and what happens when these theories are applied. [Back to top.]

Oct. 17, 2006 - Scott Radnitz, "Elite Networks and the 'Tulip Revolution'"

I presented a chapter from my dissertation, "Elite Networks and the 'Tulip Revolution,'" which was a case study of mass mobilization in Kyrgyzstan in March 2005, incorporating interviews with over 100 activists, participants, and observers in three regions of Kyrgyzstan following the revolution. I show that the mass mobilization was the result of an improvised alliance between opposition leaders after uncoordinated protests broke out around the country following rigged elections. Mobilization began when losing parliamentary candidates outside of Jalalabad mobilized networks from their communities to protest election results. Leaders affiliated with a national opposition coalition unified demonstrations in different regions to create a mass movement, which eventually toppled the government. Participation in mobilization spread by diffusion within communities and brokerage between them. [Back to top.]

Oct. 31, 2006 - Bulat Rakhimzyanov, "The Kasim Khanate and the Kasim Tatars: One Aspect of Creating a Multinational State in Russia"

The presentation was dedicated to the Kasim Tatars - a very specific ethnic group of Volga-Ural Tatars. Their history, traditional material and spiritual culture are very specific. They lived in the center of Russia during all the period of their history, and their environment was Russian in the main, and some other Tatar groups. Thus, they found a lot of common traits with them. In spite of it, they didn't lose their originality and sense of a national self-awareness.

Traditional religion of the Kasim Tatars is Islam (Sunnite Muslims). The quantity of the Kasim Tatars changed from 6000 at the beginning of the XVIII c. to 1040 at the end of the XX c. Till the beginning of the XX c. they lived mainly in the city of Kasimov and in 17 villages of this region. In our days most of the Kasim Tatars dispersively settled in central Russian cities (Saint-Petersburg, Moscow, Kazan, Ryazan), in the Middle Asia (Tashkent, Samarqand), Kazakhstan (Almaty), in Baltic states (Riga, Tallinn).

The history of the Kasim Tatars began in the middle of the XV c. At this time difficult and very complicated political situation on the territory of future Muscovy led to the formation of Tatar Kasim khanate (1445-1681), which was situated on border lands of Muscovite and Ryazan' Grand principalities. The Kasim khanate was a kind of vassal for Moscow during all the period of its exis-tence.

The originality of ethnic history of the Kasim Tatars was determined by the peculiarity of their political development. The Kasim Tatars are originated from Turk-Ugor, Altinordu (Golden Army) and Nogay-Kipchak Turkic tribes. The basis of their ethnical substratum formed Finnish, Ugrian and Turkic tribal unions, which were the original inhabitants of Meshera region still before the formation of Kasim khanate. During the period of 1445-1681 (the years of the political life of Kasim khanate) Kazan, Astrakhan, Crimean, Siberian, Nogay and Kirghiz migrants created an eth-nic superstratum of the Kasim Tatars. Ethnogenetical interaction of these tribes and nationalities exerted a great influence on the formation and development of the traditional culture of the Kasim Tatars. [Back to top.]

Nov. 7, 2006 - Benjamin Loring, "Sedentarization in Kyrgyzstan, 1921-41"

This study examines Soviet efforts to settle Kyrgyzstan’s nomadic population during the interwar period, exploring the formulation, implementation, and effect of the state’s sedentarizing efforts as well as the response they elicited from the population. Ambitious expectations, ill-informed policy decisions, intra-bureaucratic frictions, and the weakness of Soviet institutions in nomadic areas exacerbated the disastrous outcomes of the sedentarization campaign, which all but destroyed livestock-based economy on which most Kyrgyz relied, impoverishing entire regions.

Well before the Revolution, the Tsarist regime had encouraged the sedentarization of Kyrgyz nomadic pastoralists in order to free up land for European settlement. Though claiming to differ fundamentally from the colonial era, the Bolshevik leadership in the region soon found itself continuing Tsarist-era policies toward its nomadic population. The new government promised a radical transformation of Kyrgyz society, but for most of the 1920s the Communist regime paid little attention to the economic and social development of nomadic areas, relying primarily on low-priority, piecemeal measures to encourage voluntary sedentarization. These policies yielded few results – the majority of Kyrgyz remained nomadic until the forced sedentarization of 1932-3.

The Great Turn toward full collectivization led party officials to force sedentarization on the nomadic population. The resulting chaos and dislocation caused acute suffering, starvation, flight, and, in some districts, revolt. Close examination of the dynamics of the government’s decision-making reveals several key problems: first, the republic’s leadership formulated policy haphazardly in response to pressures from above and crises from below. Secondly, different parts of the state-party bureaucracy issued conflicting and contradictory orders, prompting officials at the local level to rely on coercion, stop-gap measures, and deception to meet plan requirements; moreover, poor understanding of indigenous society led to unreliable, arbitrary appraisals of  local social dynamics and, consequently, to inadequate solutions for the resulting problems. Finally, mistrust and conflict between Kyrgyz nationals in the party leadership and their European counterparts impeded their cooperation, further complicating the government’s response to policy failures.

Reports by subsequent commissions from Moscow and Tashkent exposed bureaucratic abuse and incompetence on the part of state and party officials in the Kyrgyz republic. Though some immediate improvements followed the ensuing high-profile dismissals, they did not lead to significant improvements in livestock-raising until the latter half of the 1930s. Even then, it would be another twenty years until livestock herd sizes recovered. Moreover, far from winning over Kyrgyz herdsmen and integrating them into the Soviet order, the campaigns had further alienated them from the state. [Back to top.]

Nov. 21, 2006 - Jim Critchlow, "Democratization in Uzbekistan: Factors which Could Enable an Upturn"

The general argument is that while the short-term outlook for democracy in Uzbekistan is horrible, in the long run there can be hope for a more democratic future. This is based on Uzbekistan's considerable assets: its literate population, its educated professional elite, its great cultural tradition from the days of Ibn-Sina and Ulugh Bek, its wealth in natural resources, its moderate Islamic tradition, and the hospitality and friendlness of its people toward outsiders. It is suggested that if the U.S. government seeks to promote democracy in the "Muslim world," Uzbekistan would be a better candidate than some of the other countries in which it has shown an interest. However, in recent years U.S. support for the Karimov regime has had the opposite effect. Of course, the future of democracy in Uzbekistan will also depend on the influence of Uzbekistan's powerful neighbors, Russia and China, whose present policies tend to be anti-democratic.

In any case, it should be clear that democracy can be established only by the people of a country, not from outside. Each country's democracy may have forms peculiar to it, but it is inherent in the definition of democracy that it should always provide for selection of the government by popular ballot, including the right of the people to replace the government at specified intervals through the electoral process. There must also be constitutional guarantees of basic human rights, regardless of the government.

Uzbekistan's well-wishers should recognize the democratic values inherent in the nation and encourage its people in the long-term dream of bringing them to life, despite the tyranny of the present government. [Back to top.]

Nov. 28, 2006 - Emil Souleimanov, "From 'Normalisation' to Chechenisation': Exploring the Roots of the Contemporary Inter-Chechen Violence"

Emil Souleimanov (Sulejmanov) presented a chapter of his forthcoming book (An Endless War: The Russian-Chechen Conflict in Perspective, Frankfurt am Main, Berlin, Bern, Bruxelles, New York, Oxford, Wien: Peter Lang Publishing Group 2007), in which he addressed the issue of inter-Chechen violence in the broader context of the Chechen politics following the second Russian campaign (1999). On the presentation, a wide number of problems were discussed, such as the irregularities of Chechen referenda, etc. However, the main points of the presentation were as follows:

  1. Even with Vladimir Putin having made, as it turned out retroactively, a strategic wager on the Kadyrov clan, it appears that Moscow has never abandoned its tried and true system of checks and balances. For instance, Bislan Gantamirov, perhaps the most noteworthy opposition leader in modern Chechen history, along with some pro-Russian political figures, was long kept in Chechnya as a trump card that could be played as needed if the former mufti, Ahmat Kadyrov, were to become unmanageable. They had been promised a brilliant future in politics, but were told that their time simply had not yet come. At election time, Ahmad Kadyrov and his backers had no real guarantees until the very last minute about whether the Kremlin might not be leaning toward some opponent, whether from among local or the so-called Moscow Chechens.
  2. Indeed, the stirring up of internal Chechen squabbles has been an integral part of the Chechenisation strategy. As the opposing sides have become less secure (in their disputes), they have become more dependent on Moscow and therefore more loyal to her. The divide and rule policy in the fragmented Chechen society created a very tense atmosphere that is especially apparent in the environment of the armed formations that are considered loyal to Russia, especially of the mentioned Gantamirov and Yamadayev brothers (in charge of the Eastern battalion), who represent the three major power centers in current pro-Moscow Chechen forces.
  3. Recruiting and deploying (pro-Moscow) Chechen militia units in combat operations was Ahmat Kadyrovs key mission by which he attempted to demonstrate in practice his loyalty to Moscow. Importantly, this strategy also had and still has a different, no less important significance.
  4. Kadyrovs clan had many enemies in Chechnya, and their presence represented a nightmare for Kadyrovs followers; to a certain degree, it was justifiable to claim that as long as at least one of the people that had declared a blood feud against Kadyrov was alive, neither he nor his relatives could feel truly safe. The growing numbers of Chechen militias and the ever increasing intensity of their involvement in combat operations against actual or presumed separatists and their relatives meant that the young men in the militias were becoming, as Chechens say, bound by blood to the Kadyrov clan by the constant killings, torture and humiliation that militia operations led to. Then, in order to be able to survive in the conditions of increasing insecurity, namely the very likely attacks by newly acquired enemies in blood feuds, newly recruited Chechen militia troops had to stick together with the Kadyrov clan thus falling into a trap from which there is no escape as the bridges back have already been burnt. [Back to top.]

Dec. 5, 2006 - Sonia Chinn, "Discourse on Veiling in Contemporary Central Asian Society: Symbols of Oppression and Religious Extremism?"

Since the 1990s, there is a perception that veils are reappearing in Central Asian nations. Are veiled women sympathizers of terrorist ideologies? Or mute puppets of tradition? This discussion will expand on a short paper that examines discourse on Central Asian Muslim women religious attire and its roots in the twentieth century Soviet unveiling campaign. [Back to top.]

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