Seminar Summaries 2007

• Special Roundtable - Turkmenistan After Turkmenbashi - February 27, 2007
• Edil Baisalov, "Political Instability in Kyrgyzstan: Sources of Hope and Despair" - April 5, 2007
• Galina Yemelianova, "The Rise of Islam in Eurasia: Comparative Perspectives and Potential Consequences" - April 10, 2007
• Judith Beyer, "Imagining the State: How perceptions of the state influence customary law in the Kyrgyz aqsaqal courts" - April 17, 2007
• Douglas Northrop, "Memories on the Edge of Disaster: Earthquakes in Central Eurasia" - April 26, 2007

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February 27 , 2007 - Special Roundtable - Turkmenistan After Turkmenbashi

Panel Participants:

Erika Dailey, Director, Open Society Institute's Turkmenistan Project
Irina Liczek, Assistant Professor of Political Science, Niagara University
John Schoeberlein, Director, Program on Central Asia & the Caucasus at Harvard University
Thomas Simons, Jr., Visiting Scholar, Davis Center for Russian and Eurasian Studies

Chair:

Lisbeth Tarlow, Associate Director, Davis Center

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April 5, 2007 - "Political Instability in Kyrgyzstan: Sources of Hope and Despair"

Edil Baisalov, President of the Coalition for Democracy and Civil Society

On April 5, 2007, the Program on Central Asia and the Caucasus welcomed Edil Baisalov, President of the Coalition for Democracy and Civil Society in Kyrgyzstan.  Mr. Baisalov began his talk, entitled, "Political Instability in Kyrgyzstan: Sources of Hope and Despair," with optimism.  He insisted that there were many reasons to feel proud of Kyrgyzstan and its NGO community.  Kyrgyzstan had taken several steps forward and remained a dynamic and democratic country where people had the freedom to hold demonstrations and the parliament was very active.  However, the current events on the streets of Bishkek gave Mr. Baisalov cause for worry. Mr. Baisalov talked about the so-called Tulip Revolution and its negative consequences.  He claimed that the people of Kyrgyzstan suffered a serious psychological trauma when they witnessed the looting that occurred the night of March 24, 2005.  Kyrgyz people were concerned about how the looting affected their external image, as well.  Such looting and the later rise of organized crime destroyed the good will of the people, especially when people who admitted they had participated in racketeering were allowed to run for elected office.  Meanwhile, according to Mr. Baisalov, many journalists and NGOs simply averted their eyes to such happenings. A main theme of Mr. Baisalov's talk was also his disappointment with President Bakiyev and former Prime Minister Felix Kulov.  Mr. Bakiyev's failure to deliver while in office should not have come as a surprise, according to Mr. Baisalov.  He had never described himself as a democratic idealist.  In fact, a book President Bakiyev published in 2004 listed his political hero as President Lukashenko of Belarus.  One of President Bakiyev's most dangerous policies has been to exacerbate the north-south divide, the existence of which Mr. Baisalov had denied previously.  Unfortunately, there are many who now believe that President Bakiyev needs to be removed from power because he is from the south, and consequently, a bad president.  There is a common perception that President Bakiyev is bringing thousands of mid-level bureaucrats and police officers from the south and installing them in key positions.  Those from the south, however, believe it is their turn to rule after fifteen years of "northern rule."  Because of the increasing antagonisms which are articulated in such terms, Mr. Baisalov has been forced to admit that the perception of a north-south divide in Kyrgyzstan is widespread. More had been expected of Mr. Kulov, however.  He had served five years in jail, and Mr. Kulov's cause had for the last few years attracted widespread support of the political opposition.  According to Mr. Baisalov, people had expected Mr. Kulov to be more active and to publicize the intentions and efforts of the new government.  Yet, Mr. Kulov remained silent and actually contributed to increasing the authoritarian nature of the presidency.  Mr. Baisalov recalled how Mr. Kulov had similarly strengthened Akayev's presidency a decade earlier.  Once Mr. Kulov was removed from his post as Prime Minister, Mr. Baisalov claimed that Mr. Kulov now became driven by his personal ambition and anger that President Bakiyev betrayed him.  Mr. Baisalov worried that the large rally which Mr. Kulov is now organizing in Bishkek has great potential for unleashing conflict. To conclude, Mr. Baisalov noted that although the demonstrations currently taking place in Bishkek appear similar to those which occurred in November, 2006, the potential for conflict is much higher.  He emphasized that because democracy takes time, people should be more tolerant and patient.  However, Mr. Baisalov confidently predicted that in a year or decade's time, the people of Kyrgyzstan would be proud of the events now taking place. Mr. Baisalov answered questions regarding the so-called north-south divide, the large ethnic Uzbek minority and its role in Kyrgyz politics, the model Kyrgyzstan may serve for other countries in the region, foreign investment in Kyrgyzstan, and whether Mr. Baisalov considers himself an idealist. - Susan Sypko

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April 10, 2007 - "The Rise of Islam in Eurasia: Comparative Perspectives and Potential Consequences"

Galina Yemelianova, Senior Research Fellow, Centre for Russian and East European Studies, University of Birmingham

Galina Yemelianova at the seminar

On April 10, 2007, the Program on Central Asia and the Caucasus was very glad to have Dr. Galina Yemelianova speak on the topic of "The Rise of Islam in Eurasia: Comparative Perspectives and Potential Consequences."  After briefly commenting on the historical and cultural background of the 60 million Muslims who live in the post-Soviet space, Dr. Yemelianova presented the results of research she conducted in the Volga Urals, the North Caucasus, and the Ferghana Valley. Regarding the region of the Volga Urals, Dr. Yemelianova concluded that one cannot speak of an Islamic revival.  The region is generally secularized because of higher standards of living, a longer period of Russian political and cultural domination, a higher level of industrialization, and a large population of non-Muslims.  She found that the majority of the population had not been affected by the rise of Islam.  According to Dr. Yemelianova, the process of radicalization that had happened was "interesting," because it had occurred among imams within the doctrinal realm.  As a result of the influence of external missionaries' activity in the region in the 1980s-1990s, there was a madhhab shift from the Hanafi to Hanbali madhhab.  Imams who continued to promote a Hanafi orientation emphasized the importance of taqlid, or tradition, and referred negatively to ijtihad, or interpretation.  These conservative imams were in favor of "reinventing Sufism" because they saw it as an antidote to fundamentalism, but Dr. Yemelianova stressed that Sufism had been eradicated under the Soviets.  According to her, the presence of the Hanbalis may create problems in the region, because Hanafi Islam was more syncretistic and suitable for the diverse environment.  For now, however, Dr. Yemelianova believes that government officials exaggerate the threat of radicalism in the region.  In addition to the establishment of the Hanbali madhhab in the Volga Urals, Dr. Yemelianova also discussed the rise of three different Islamic ideologies that were unique to the region: Faizrahmanism, Tatar modernisim, and Euroislam. Dr. Yemelianova then talked about her conclusions regarding the rise of Islam and radicalization in the North Caucasus.  She contrasted this region with that of the Volga Urals.  Here, where the region was less industrialized and the socio-economic situation was worse, Dr. Yemelianova believed that one could talk about an Islamic revival.  In particular, there was a resurgence of Sufism, especially in Daghestan and Chechnya, where Sufis control the muftiates.  Until the mid-1990s, there seemed to be a balance between those who were considered moderates and those who promoted violence to achieve their goal of Islamization.  After 1997, however, the situation changed in favor of the jihadis, which Dr. Yemelianova attributed to an anti-Wahhabi law passed in Daghestan.  Since then, scholars have seen the spread of jihadi Islam, most surprisingly in the western part of the North Caucasus, Kabardino-Balkaria.  There has also been a merger between Islamic organizations in Daghestan and terrorist organizations. Next, Dr. Yemelianova briefly touched upon her conclusions from the Central Asian region.  She noted the change in dynamic and agency there.  Until the mid-1990s, the main actors promoting Islamization of the region were the Islamic Revival Party and Wahhabists.  In 1996, however, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, and in 1999, the Hizb ut-Tahrir party have come to play important roles. Finally, Dr. Yemelianova ended with some general conclusions regarding the rise of Islam in the Eurasian region.  She noted that the main recipients of radical ideology were young men, and increasingly, young women.  Socio-economic conditions tended to be congruent with the increase in Islamic radicalism.  While there seemed to be no interaction between organizations from within the three regions, they all had interactions with the same centers in countries like Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Saudi Arabia.  Indirect foreign involvement in the form of the hajj, study abroad, and websites continues to contribute to the changing dynamic in the region.  Although the impact of the radicalization of some organizations in the region has had a marginal impact on politics, Dr. Yemelianova warned that the prolongation of the current economic conditions and corruption would continue the trend of radicalization. Dr. Yemelianova answered questions regarding the future of Chechnya, Russia's role in the Middle East, Russian scholars' Orientialist orientations, the appropriateness of setting benchmarks for measuring Islam, Sufism as an antidote to Islamist radicalization, and the importance of official repression in the radicalization process. - Susan Sypko

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April 17, 2007 - "Imagining the State: How perceptions of the state influence customary law in the Kyrgyz aqsaqal courts"

Judith Beyer, Researcher, Max Planck Institute for Social Anthropology, Halle

On April 17, 2007, Judith Beyer, a researcher from the Max Planck Institute for Social Anthropology, presented her results from research on aqsaqal courts in Talas, Kyrgyzstan at the Program on Central Asia and the Caucasus's seminar meeting.  In 1995, then President Askar Akaev introduced a new law establishing aqsaqal courts, which were promoted as customary legal institutions.  Aqsaqal literally means "white beard," and the elders of the community were thus expected to play a role in dispute settlement.  While the concept of aqsaqal had existed for centuries, the institution of an aqsaqal court had not.  Ms. Beyer argued that as these new aqsaqal courts apply what they perceive to be state law and act in a way they believe a state institution should, they are, in effect, creating new customary law and reconstructing images of the state.  This has especially been the case since the state has increasingly left the aqsaqal courts to their own devices. According to Ms. Beyer, there are three ways in which images of the state are created.  First, sometimes officials come to the village to talk with the mayor or to announce news.  Initially, these officials invited the village aqsaqals to meetings to tell them about new laws.  They represented higher officials and the state's center in Bishkek.  More recently, however, aqsaqals have started complaining that the state has lost interest.  Second, the impressions people get of the state from television, whether it be an official presidential address or broadcasts of the American serial "Law and Order," contribute to the creation of the state's image.  Aqsaqals occasionally refer to something they heard on television to legitimate themselves.  Finally, the legacy of Soviet rule has ingrained in people the notion that order is attributed to one person and it is maintained by one person.  Now some Kyrgyz complain that the previous level of order during the Soviet era has not been reached in Kyrgyzstan. Ms. Beyer then showed how the image of the state is invoked and reconstructed by inviting participants of the seminar to role-play a divorce case she had witnessed during her field work in Talas.  Analyzing the divorce case, Ms. Beyer pointed out that the state is used to threaten people who do not want to go to the aqsaqal court.  Aqsaqals portray the state as something to be feared in order to strengthen their own position as representatives of the state.  In the divorce case Ms. Beyer presented, the young man being forced to attend the aqsaqal proceedings associated the court with prison and with death.  During the court session, the head aqsaqal followed procedures that he thought should be applied.  For example, he asked the defendant to stand when being talked to and to sit down afterwards.  Although there is no legal basis for such proceedings, they seem to lend authority to the decisions being made inside the courtroom because people perceive such procedures to be state mandated.  Ms. Beyer noted that aqsaqals learn about procedures and the "proper" behavior of judges from television shows.  Finally, Ms. Beyer argued that the aqsaqal in the divorce case was able to introduce a new fee for aqsaqal court decisions because of his position as head aqsaqal and the fact that Akaev had presented him with an award several years earlier, thus legitimating the aqsaqal as a representative of the state in a position of authority.  She concluded that even though hardly anything during the proceedings had been executed according to law, it was presented as legal. The latest trend in legal anthropology has been to examine how citizens are fighting the state with the state's own tools.  In this case, they are creatively reinterpreting the law against the state.  While aqsaqals are invoking the state to raise their own authority, the absence of the state is also being used by them to increase their own power.  Meanwhile, the government's decentralization and lack of interest in resolving disputes has limited the options that people have as they are forced to go to aqsaqal courts.  Although the aqsaqal courts are supposed to represent the state, they are using "imagined state law," and as a result, customary law is being created today. Ms. Beyer answered questions about exploitation by aqsaqals, the relationship between state and aqsaqal courts, the role of Islamic law in aqsaqal courts, customs (urp adat) vs. law (zakon), the transnational aspects of law being applied in the courts, and the continuity between Soviet era kolkhoz leaders and aqsaqals. - Susan Sypko

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April 26, 2007 - "Memories on the Edge of Disaster: Earthquakes in Central Eurasia"

Douglas Northrop, Associate Professor of Modern Central Asian Studies, University of Michigan

Douglas Northrop at the Seminar

The Program on Central Asia and the Caucasus was pleased to welcome Douglas Northrop on April 26, 2007, for a seminar on the topic of, "Memories of Disaster: Earthquakes and Empire on the Eurasian Frontier."  Dr. Northrop started his presentation by pointing out that although historians do not like to talk about universals, natural disasters are one of the few constants of life.  Yet, because human responses and interpretations of these events vary widely, natural disasters can reveal the social grammars, sets of rules, and hierarchies of a given society.  Moreover, they have the potential to reshape the social world, since natural disasters open new spaces for debate.  People are more willing to speak out during times of crisis. Dr. Northrop first explained why he had chosen to focus on earthquakes on the territory of the Russian and Soviet empires.  By placing a map of seismic activity in the region over a political map, he revealed a very striking pattern.  Seismic activity was concentrated on or beyond the Russian (and Soviet) empire's political edges.  It is important to note that if one goes back far enough in history, these places were not part of Russia.  Yet, as the Russian Empire grew, it came to incorporate these places, precisely where Slavs and non-Slavs were forced to live together.  The success or failure of overcoming a disaster could be a "political talisman."  The Soviet Union viewed nature and even human nature as malleable, as is evident in the rerouting of rivers or the unveiling campaign.  Yet, the occurrence of earthquakes presented an obstacle to that language of malleability.  Dr. Northrop then demonstrated how this tension played out in the debates on architecture, science, and commemoration.  The Soviet government used earthquakes, for example, to denounce the architecture of the old city in Tashkent.  While they had been denounced for decades as un-modern, now the old city's structures were denounced on grounds of public safety.  Officials claimed that these structures were more likely to collapse.  As the old city was leveled, large communal apartment buildings went up.  (Hardly coincidentally, these buildings allowed neighbors to watch over each other better and affected how women had been secluded earlier.)  Yet in the earthquakes in Ashkhabad, Turkmenistan, and Spitak, Armenia, Central Eurasians noticed that Soviet buildings, not their mud-brick homes, were more likely to collapse. Soviet scientists also faced dilemmas in trying to explain the occurrence of earthquakes.  Before the plate tectonic model was developed in the late 1960s, Soviet geologists did not have a clear understanding of what was happening. Disagreement among Soviet scientists meant that their opponents' explanations were more persuasive to locals.  For example, the earthquake in Namangan, Uzbekistan, in 1927, took place six weeks after the Communist Party launched the Hujum, the unveiling campaign. Earthquakes also have the potential to be "hot potatoes" in collective memory.  For example, the earthquake in 1989 in Spitak destabilized Gorbachev's power as Armenian nationalists claimed that the central government was to blame for the earthquake's human costs.  Consequently, Soviet public campaigns were important in commemorating earthquakes in a particular way.  The Soviets presented the Tashkent earthquake as an event which demonstrated the "friendship of the peoples," as citizens from all over the USSR sent aid to the region. Dr. Northrop ended his presentation by giving short overviews of the earthquakes in Fort Vernyi (now Almaty) at the beginning of the 20th century, in Ashkhabad in 1948, and in Tashkent in 1966.  He then answered questions on the issue of blame, current policies regarding earthquakes, informal forms of commemoration, the relationship of earthquakes to weather, information management, and Muslim aid to other Muslims, among many other things. - Susan Sypko

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Program on Central Asia and the Caucasus
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